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LEGAL OR POLITICAL CHECKS ON APEX CRIMINALITY:
AN ESSAY ON CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Aziz Z. Huq
Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University
of Chicago
ABSTRACT
How should constitutional designers address the problem of
apex criminality, or criminal actions by those elected or
appointed to high positions in a national government? I
offer three general observations about this difficult question
of constitutional design. First, it is not at all clear that a
constitutional designer ought to expend effort on creating
accountability mechanisms to address apex criminality.
Second, if a designer does choose to address the question,
she must opt between two highly imperfect options—a ‘legal’
mechanism embedded in a nonpartisan body such as a
prosecutor’s office, or a ‘political’ mechanism, which runs
through an elected body such as a legislature. There is no
simple answer to the question of which is optimal. Third, a
better way to approach the constitutional design question
may be in terms of the kinds of political culture that will
likely unfold under a new constitution. Even if a designer
cannot easily optimize some single metric of national
welfare, she can make an intelligent judgment about the
character of political life she hopes to inspire.
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INTRODUCTION
How should a constitutional designer address the risk of
criminal acts by elected or appointed figures at the very apex of
government? Is there an optimal means by which allegations of
what might be called apex criminality can be investigated and
sanctioned? Or instead, is it more sensible for a constitutional
designer to say nothing about the problem at all? These questions
are resonant ones in both new democracies and in polities
undergoing constitutional reform after periods of misrule. Even
for established constitutional democracies, these questions might
usefully be posed as a way to prime intuitions about
subconstitutional design choices. At a minimum, they might high
clarify the kind of considerations that should inform judgments
about extant institutions.
My aim here is to show illuminate the dilemmas that a
constitutional designer must work through in deciding whether and
how to address apex criminality. I want to frame the question as a
general one, a matter of constitutional design in the abstract rather
than an inquiry into U.S. constitutional law, for two reasons. First,
the question of whether there is an optimal response to apex
criminality is a general one, and it is a mistake to think that the
United States has some kind of monopoly on shoddy leaders or
institutional devices to deal with shoddy leaders. In 2017 alone, a
policing scandal engulfed the Fine Gael Deputy Prime Minister in
Eire; in France, a tax avoidance and corruption imbroglio
undermined the center-right presidential candidate’s polling lead;
and in Brazil, Congress started impeachment proceedings for
alleged financial improprieties against its second president in a
year. And this is not even to mention the questions swirling
around the White House related to foreign emoluments, adult film
actresses, and mysterious videotapes of cavorting Slavic sex
workers. Apex criminality is a pervasive problem that demands a
general answer.
Second, the U.S. Constitution is surprisingly opaque as to how
apex criminality should be addressed. The resulting debates have
been extended, colored by partisan and institutional bias, tend to be
inconclusively mired in the murk of conflicting original public
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understandings, historical glosses, and institutional self-dealing.
Article II thus identifies the possibility of impeachment for
presidents and other senior officials.1 But the text does not state
that impeachment is the only means of removing a senior elected
or appointed official. At best, the historical answer to the question
whether impeachment leaves space for alternative mechanisms has
been a “tentative no.”2 But is this answer trustworthy? Even a
casual glance at the literature reveals the dominance of lawyerly
voices from within the executive branch. 3 Such voices can hardly
be taken to be neutral arbiters of a question that bears directly on
the authority of their boss. More independent analysts reach rather
different outcomes. 4 In any event, I read the American debate on
how to deal with apex criminality as too narrowly focused on a
rather ineffable question of whether one should draw a negative
inference from the text of Article II, or whether to construe a
historical practice dominated by self-interested, partisan actors as
conclusive as to constitutional meaning. It is not hard to spin
creative readings of materials from the Founding period to reach
sharply divergent results. I rather doubt, though, that any claim
about what the Constitution really ‘means’ can help us understand
how institutions will in fact behave, especially given the marked
shift in political-party dynamics in Congress between 1789 and
2018. In short, the kind of inquiries stimulated by the U.S.
constitutional materials get us no closer, in my view, to an
understanding of how appropriately to deal with the hard and
enduring problem of how to address apex criminality.
1.
See U.S. Const. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all
civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.”).
2.
Ken Gormley, Impeachment and the Independent Counsel: A
Dysfunctional Union, 51 STAN. L. REV. 309, 315 (1999).
3.
See, e.g., id. (citing numerous executive branch lawyers).
4.
Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Interaction Between Impeachment and the
Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. L.J. 2193, 2227-28 (1998) (distinguishing
between impeachment and criminal prosecution, and concluding that the former
does not preclude the latter).
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In what follows, I offer instead three general conclusions by
reasoning from first principles of institutional design. These
conclusions are best understood as hypotheses rather than firm
conclusions about how to deal wit apex criminality. By working
from clear, logical premises, and by being clear about the empirical
predicates of each step of the argument, I hope to avoid reliance on
the controversial jurisprudential and normative grounds that infest
the U.S. debate, and instead develop a more general sense of how
constitutional design might address apex criminality.
The first claim developed below is a bit counterintuitive. It is
that a rational constitutional designer might decide to remain silent
on questions of apex criminality. The core intuition here is that
most of times that apex criminality imposes truly massive costs, it
cannot be mitigated by formal constitutional rules. My second
claim is that the basic choice facing constitutional designers is
between ‘legal’ mechanisms, which involve apolitical expert
bodies such as prosecutors’ offices, ‘political’ mechanisms, which
run through elected bodies such as legislatures, or some mix of the
two. Neither the corner solutions nor any mix of both legal and
political mechanisms, however, is obviously optimal. There are
risks all around. Finally, I suggest that a constitutional designer can
usefully be guided by asking what kind of political culture, or
“project,” she wishes to seed through her constitutional design.5 It
should be the pursuit that of that bespoke project, I think, that
should guide our constitutional designer more than any simple
notion of optional design.
This means that, at least in the compass of this paper, I offer
no judgment about ‘what is to be done’ about President Trump. As
of early 2018, the creation and working of a special counsel to
5.
I borrow the term “project” from the great philosopher Bernard
Williams. J.C.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR &
AGAINST 112 (1993). In the passage that I have in mind, Williams criticizes the
implicit psychology of utilitarianism by pointing out its inability to account for
the “vast range of projects, or … commitments” that humans pursue beyond and
instead of the pursuit of aggregate happiness. Id. Following Williams, I think it
is more sensible here to think about what kind of “project” a constitutional
entails than to think about how to maximize, say, national welfare.
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investigate the Trump campaign and the Trump White House6 had
sparked a lively if predictably bimodal debate about the merits of
different modes of accountability. Careful analysts recognized the
inevitable interaction of legal and political channels.7 Less nuanced
voices seemed to reject, almost wholesale, any formalized process
except for impeachment outside of very rare scenarios (which, in
any event, would be unlikely to come to public attention without a
formalized process).8 The question of institutional choice raised
by these debates, however, is not the one that I aim to pursue here
directly. If there was a moment at which the U.S. could have
adopted a well-measured constitutional response to apex
criminality, that moment has long passed. There is no plausible
way that in the midst of l’affaire russe an optimal institutional
structure could be adopted. In consequence, the question in the
U.S. context is how best to muddle along with our antediluvian
constitutional text, which (even if it did speak clearly) distilled no
rare wisdom to illuminate the current situation. Probably the best
that can be hoped for in the current U.S. context is a modicum of
commitment to democratic norms, and a smidgeon of shame about
overt criminality, on the part of key congressional and executive
leaders. It is telling that even this rather modest hope is probably
unrealistic.
THE PROBLEM OF APEX CRIMINALITY
My central aim here is to think through which a wise
constitutional designer would opt for legal or political instruments
to deal with apex criminality. This quandary of procedural choice,
6.
Devlin Barrett et al., Deputy Attorney General Appoints Special
Counsel to Oversee Probe of Russian Interference in Election, WASH. POST
(May 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/deputy-attorney-general-appoints-special-counsel-to-oversee-pro
7.
See, e.g., Bob Bauer, Why Team Trump Needs to Lay Off the
Mueller Probe, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2017),
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/opinion/trump-mueller-probe.html
(discussing the reliance of congressional inquiries on the evidentiary production
of investigations within the Justice Department).
8.
See Alan M. Dershowitz, When Politics is Criminalized, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 28, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/28/opinion/politicsinvestigations-trump-russia.html.
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however, is necessarily entangled with questions about the
substance of criminal regulation that covers high-level elected
officials. That is, one might want to start by defining what counts
as apex criminality before explaining how it is to be investigated or
prosecuted. But I don’t think that’s necessarily so. I hence start by
explaining why I think this question of substantive law is relatively
straightforward, and hence can be bracketed if we want to isolate
and think through the truly difficult questions of constitutional
design.
If one were to judge by the American debates, this relegation
of substantive law would hardly seem obvious. In that context,
there is an active debate on whether it is just some subset of
presidential “high” crimes that warrants investigation and
punishment, and whether there is a different and distinct class of
“maladministration” that does not.9 One possible inference from
that debate is that any judgment about the processes used for
addressing apex criminality must start with a view about the exact
nature and scope of the acts to be regulated. If accountability
mechanisms will inevitably operate in different ways depending on
the breadth of their mandate, then surely substance and
institutional choice are necessarily entangled.
But there are a couple of reasons to think that substance need
not precede process. For one thing, there is a deep-seated tendency
in American legal thought to focus upon second-order questions of
institutional choice (‘who decides’) in lieu of first-order questions
of how primary conduct should be regulated (‘what should be
decided’). This approach is most commonly associated with the
legal process school.10 A legal process scholar might point out that
it makes sense to start with institutional choice because doing so
9.
See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95
MINN. L. REV. 347, 349–51 (2010) (offering as a criterion for impeachment a
class of “assassinable offenses”). On the English practice of impeachment for
maladministration, see But there were others for misconduct unrelated to the
performance of official duties and for various acts of maladministration. Note,
The Scope of the Power to Impeach, 84 YALE L.J. 1316, 1326 (1975).
10.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of
The Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2044–45 (1994) (introducing the
institutional focus of the Legal Process school).
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brackets hard normative questions. She would suggest that by
attending to a domain of relatively abstract, technocratic choices,
consensus is more likely to be achieved. Further, she might note, it
makes sense starting by asking what one instruments one has to
hand, so that one can make a judgment about what kinds of
criminality can and should be addressed.
I am skeptical of the legal process appeal to apolitical,
technocratic neutrality. Nevertheless, I think it makes sense to
focus on institutional choice rather than substantive law because I
suspect that the question of what primary conduct by an apex
official falls outside criminal bounds is more tractable and less
contentious than it might first appear. Start with the general part of
the criminal law. Few, I think, would openly endorse an elected
head of government or head of state who, say, openly and
notoriously committed murder on New York’s Fifth Avenue, or for
that matter larceny, manslaughter, or (I hope) sexual assault. 11
Elective office should not be a ticket for gross criminality, and it
would seem to be common ground that such serious felonies ought
to be punishable even when committed by senior elected or
appointed actors. One might hew to this view even if one thought
that it was best to defer prosecution until a person is no longer in
office. Perhaps the best argument that might be mustered against
this view of the scope of liability turns on the risk that an elected
official will respond to the risk of prosecution be declining to leave
office at all. In some jurisdictions, for example, elected leaders use
their political authority to undo term limits that are intended to
11.
But consider here the case of President Roderigo Duterte of the
Philippines, who has proudly proclaimed that he had “personally pulled the
trigger and killed three people as mayor of Davao City.” Russell Goldman, ‘I
Cannot Lie,’ Rodrigo Duterte Says, Confirming He Did Kill People as Mayor,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/world/asia/philippines-rodrigo-duterteconfirms-killings-davao.html. Consider also that, as of this writing, it is not
Duterte, but the Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, who has resisted
his policies, who faces impeachment. Felipe Vilamor, She Stood Up to Duterte.
Now She Faces Impeachment, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/world/asia/philippines-chief-justiceduterte.html.
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prevent individuals from entrenching themselves in power.12 In
other jurisdictions, where there are no meaningful elections, there
is some evidence to suggest that leaders are less likely to depart
peacefully when they reasonably expect to be prosecuted in an
international court after the fact.13 But let us posit for now that
there is no substantial risk of entrenchment beyond term limits for
fear of future prosecution: Much of the familiar criminal law of
serious felonies, absent that risk, should plainly apply to apex
officials’ conduct.
Beyond serious felonies, there is also a class of criminal
offenses for which the possession and misuse of official power are
a sine qua non. Bribery, insofar as it involves the solicitation or
receipt of unlawful gratuities, is an example of an offense that (in
one form) can only be committed by an official.14 It is possible to
imagine an argument that a high-level official, such as a president,
is inherently exempt from such regulation on the ground that
whether is done with official authority is ipso facto legal.15 The
argument might be that the very definition of their her powers is
without bounds, so she is entitled to take official actions for any
12.
See, e.g., Jina Moore, Uganda Lifts an Age Limit, Paving the Way
for a President for Life, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017),
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/world/africa/uganda-president-museveniage-limit.html. For an empirical study of presidential efforts to evade term
limits, see Tom Ginsburg et al., On the Evasion of Executive Term Limits, 52
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1807 (2011).
13.
For evidence that the creation of the International Criminal Court
has dampened the willingness of certain national leaders to relinquish power, see
Daniel Krcmaric, Should I Stay or Should I Go? Leaders, Exile, and the
Dilemmas of International Justice, 62 AM. J. POL. SCI. 499 (2018).
14.
18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (2012) (bribery of public officials).
15.
This seems to be Alan Dershowitz’s position, although he
describes the receipt of bribes as beyond the president’s authority. Isaac
Chotiner, An Argument with Alan Dershowitz, SLATE (Dec. 4, 2017),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/interrogation/2017/12/an_inter
view_with_alan_dershowitz_on_trump_and_the_mueller_investigation.html. I
am not convinced this distinction is a tenable one. For example, imagine a
president who concededly uses a “constitutional authority” (e.g., the power to
instruct his subordinates) as a quid pro quo for sexual favors from a subordinate.
That person, on Dershowitz’s definition is immune from penalty—a result that
seems quite unappealing to me.
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reason, including a bad reasons, without repercussions. Recent
deployments of the “unitary president” logic in the U.S. sometimes
have that flavor to them.
But it is tough to see why those arguments would have much
normative traction. Why should it be lawful for a head of state to
take bribes or cultivate foreign emoluments? Why should their
official actions, when taken with culpable motives, be immune
from scrutiny or punishment? Bracketing for a second the problem
of improper investigations, there is per se no reason to endow
officials by dint of their hierarchical authority with a categorical
exemption from the criminal laws tailored to prevent the misuse of
official powers by dint of their hierarchical authority. One might
appeal to the possibility of retrospective voting as a cure for this
sort of behavior, which doesn’t exist for lower-ranked officials.
But it requires rather heroic assumptions to conclude that an
elected official willing to bribe or abuse her powers would not also
do their her utmost to obfuscate her culpability. We should instead
expect her to throw the shadow of blame on her political
opponents, and deploy dark instruments (including bribery of her
own) to anchor her popular legitimacy. Absent an “unbundled”16
franchise in which voters can express judgments about discrete
governmental functions, it is therefore quite hard to see the allure
of an exclusive reliance on retrospective voting as a cure for
bribery or similar kinds of self-dealing.
In short, I think it is reasonably clear that apex officials should
be amenable to punishment for serious felonies and crimes such as
bribery, which involve the abuse of official power. The definition
of apex criminality’s substance, that is, may be simple enough that
there is no need to expend much time analyzing it.
HOW SHOULD CONSTITUTIONS ADDRESS APEX CRIMINALITY?
It would be too quick to move from this point to the further,
separate conclusion that a constitutional designer should address
16.
Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 VA. L. REV. 301, 304
(2010) (characterizing “the “unbundled powers alternative” as one in which
“[m]ultiple branches exercising combined functions in topically limited
domains”.).
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the question of apex criminality in her text. Instead, and perhaps
surprisingly, it might well be sensible for our designer to refrain
from including any particular procedural solution in the text, and
leave the matter open to subsequent deliberation and resolution
through the ordinary processes of politics. Where a constitution is
democratic in orientation, this might mean that relatively stable
institutions emerge. Or it might allow ad hoc responses to
allegations to depend on transient local political conjunctures.
While my focus here is on democratic constitutionalism, it is worth
noting that silence in an authoritarian constitution might
reasonably be taken to signal de facto or de jure immunity from
ordinary criminal laws for apex figures.17
Lest the prospect of ad hocery seem implausible, we might
look again at the 1787 text of the U.S. Constitution. As I have
already noted, its text mentions impeachment without offering a
precise or lucid account of its substantive bounds, let alone
whether it implicitly precludes the possibility of a parallel criminal
prosecution.18 Nor does the text define the criminal immunities of
senior executive branch officials in the same way that it delineates
the analog immunity of national legislators in the Speech and
Debate Clause.19 To be sure, the Department of Justice concluded
in 1973, and then reaffirmed in 2000, that “neither the text nor the
history of the Constitution” settle the question of whether there is a
singular right way to investigate and punish criminal acts by a
sitting president.20 But to what extent should be conclusions of
executive branch lawyers be seen as being free of the institutional
interests of the executive branch itself? It is always possible to
17.
But not necessarily. Even tyrants need to coordinate teams of
subordinates, in part by making credible commitments, which might be
supported by accountability mechanisms. For a terrific illustration of this point
using Stalin’s subordinates as a case study, see SHEILA FITZPATRICK, ON
STALIN’S TEAM: THE YEARS OF LIVING DANGEROUSLY IN SOVIET POLITICS 1-14
(2015).
18.
For an effort to gloss the text that illustrates the rich complexities
that entails, see CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 25–52
(1974) (analyzing scope of impeachment under Article II).
19.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
20.
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, A Sitting President’s Amenability to
Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 OP. O.L.C. 222, 236 (2000).
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plumb the archives, the antiquarian dictionaries, and the Kuiper
Belt of analogic reasoning and intertextual inference to conclude
that there is, in fact, a definitive answer to be had in the text. But
this sort of enterprise seems to me to rest on the heroic but
implausible assumption that the relevant legal materials, if held at
just the right angle in just the right autumnal light, will refract out
one right answer. Better, I think, to acknowledge that textual
oversight and ambiguity have alchemized not a magic bullet, but a
long historical wobbling between Congressional investigation,
impeachment, independent counsel, and special counsel. On this
view, the U.S. Constitution effectively left open the question of
how and when apex officials could be punished in some fashion
for their serious criminal acts. Subsequent generations have filled
in that gap with a variety of interpretations, and it is a mistake to
think that any one answer to the question is ‘right’ or ‘final.’ One
might further think that the combination of constitutional silence
and ad hocery has to date not been a disaster for the United States
(although it is exceedingly difficult to see how the history can be
seen as exemplary, or a model for others to emulate).
Even if allegations of high-level criminality are ubiquitous,
and even if some fraction are credible, that still does not mean the
constitutional text must have a firm and clear answer. A
reasonable constitutional designer might conclude that she has
bigger fish to fry. If she is sufficiently uncertain about the likely
downstream negative consequences of any given accountability
mechanism, she may well decide it is better to leave well enough
alone.
Avoiding an unintentional catalysis of catastrophic
outcomes is, I’ve argued elsewhere, an entirely plausible
touchstone of constitutional design.21 Constitutional creation,
moreover, often requires a delicate braiding of extant vested
interests with an impulse toward transformation, a task that leaves
little room for the consideration of uncertain, contingent future
travails. Our designer might reasonably think her time and efforts
are better expended on the task of resolving the immediate pressing
21.
See Aziz Z. Huq, Hippocratic Constitutional Design, in ASSESSING
CONSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE 39 (Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Z. Huq eds., 2016).
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problems that motivated a constitution’s adoption, rather than a
distant and abstract possibility of future defalcations.
The point can be made more forcefully yet: Our reasonable
constitutional designer might say to herself that apex criminality is
not a catastrophic outcome, and perhaps not even a very important
one. Drawing on recent experience, she might observe that
discrete instances of high-level criminality may be “relatively
trivial” and as such may not impose significant social costs.22
Would it endanger La République française if, for example,
Penelope Fillon had indeed been overpaid as a parliamentary
assistant? What really is the important President Trump’s various
and sundry mooted criminalities? Would it matter now if he had
conspired to violate the Logan Act,23 or had obstructed justice in
violation of federal law by, among other things, firing the director
of the FBI? The President has already been refreshingly candid in
welcoming Russian interference and in affirmatively embracing
the self-dealing (and perhaps “corrupt[]”24) reasons for firing
James Comey, and yet political life seems to tick on in its usual
way. A cynic might say that when a nation’s political culture is
already endemically characterized by lies, culpable omissions, or
gross negligence with respect to the factual predicates of one’s
claims, then even candidly confessed apex criminality will not be
terribly important. It may instead be but one of a host of more
pressing concerns, and certainly not one that necessarily warrants a
constitutional response.
This somewhat jaundiced view of political life might seek
succor from the thought that lies and rotten deal are not merely
incidental to democratic political life. They are one of its necessary
components. “No one succeeds in politics without getting his
hands dirty,” or so the conventional wisdom since Sartre, Weber,
or perhaps Machiavelli, goes.25 Private vices do not always cash
22.
Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 GEO.
L.J. 2267, 2270–71 (1998).
23.
18 U.S.C. § 953.
24.
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b).
25.
Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160, 164 (1973). For a useful genealogy of this idea, see
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out into infirmities of state. Instead, as Michael Walzer has
suggested, they are a necessary part of the daily fabric of political
life in a world characterized by morally fraught and unavoidable
compromises.26 If some degree of falling away from moral and
legal standards is an inevitable part of political life, then perhaps
the costs of even gross criminality are not sufficiently great to
warrant the installation of constitutional checks.
But aren’t the consequences of apex criminality sufficiently
bad to justify some kind of constitutional prophylaxis? One could
point to the hecatombs flowing from state violence in the twentieth
and early twenty-first century, and demand apex accountability
devices to forestall their repetition. But great crimes are more
often committed through the state than against the state. From the
Japanese internment to the Red Scare, most serious incursions on
human wellbeing have been executed by the state as state policy
with the enthusiastic support of much of the populace. The
mechanisms for the redress of apex criminality will rarely be wellfitted to the task of parrying or responding to mass atrocity done
for reasons of state. Such crimes are commonly executed by
political and legal institutions acting most often with hearty
popular support. Mechanisms for the redress of mundane
criminality will crack and splinter before such democratic pressure,
providing no prophylactic at all. A separate debate must therefore
be had about how such horrors are to be held at bay, or redressed
after the terrible fact. To the extent that debate is relevant here, it
is indirectly: A safeguard against atrocity on a mass scale is the
preservation of ordinary politics as a means for channeling and
resolving the inevitable daily conflicts of a nation-scaled
collectivity.
All that said, even if there is no compulsion to address apex
criminality, it cannot be said that the endeavor is frivolous or
slight. Scale matters to official criminality’s significance: the
C.A.J. Coady, The Problem of Dirty Hands, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed.) (2014)
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/dirty-hands/.
26.
Walzer, supra note 25, at 165 (giving the example of a “candidate
[who] must make a deal with a dishonest ward boss” in order to secure office).
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occasional crime, iterated often enough, becomes an epidemic that
can threaten the public’s trust in the state and its sense of
institutional legitimacy.27 Although the antique U.S. Constitution
is unclear as to the appropriate response to apex criminality, more
recent constitutions typically adopt ombudsmen, anti-corruption
agencies, or other bespoke devices to mitigate that risk that highlevel officials misbehave. Today, data from the Comparative
Constitutions Project suggests that the modal constitution now has
four such independent bodies of one form or another denominated
as ombudsmen or the like.28 For example Chapter IX of South
Africa’s Constitution provides a set of state institutions supporting
constitutional democracy, including the Public Protector (a sort of
ombudsman); a Human Rights Commission to promote and protect
human rights; a Commission for the Promotion and Protection of
Cultural, Religious, and Linguistic Communities; a Commission
for Gender Equality; an Auditor-General; and an Independent
Electoral Commission. 29 That the dominant trend in constitutionwriting today is toward legal rather than political responses to apex
criminality, though, should not foreclose further inquiry. The mere
existence of such bodies does not imply their sound operation, or
deny the existence of superior institutional alternatives.
An argument in favor of addressing apex criminality in the
constitutional text might proceed along the following lines. The
important consequences of apex criminality does not necessary
adhere in the grubby particulars of one person’s offense. We do
not, and should not, intrinsically care about President’s Trump’s
financial or sexual misadventures, and more than we should have
cared about President’s Clinton’s. But like pebbles cast across
placid waters, discrete instances of apex malfeasance, and the
public’s responses to them, may have consequences that are more
27.
For case studies of democracy unraveled by endemic corruption,
see generally JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, DEMOCRACY IN RETREAT: THE REVOLT OF
THE MIDDLE CLASS AND THE WORLDWIDE DECLINE OF REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 101-16 (2013).
28.
TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ HUQ, HOW TO SAVE YOUR
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (forthcoming 2018).
29.
S. Afr. Const., 1996, ch. 9.
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systemic, and hence of greater interest to a constitutional designer
than their immediate profile would have suggested.
One
possibility is a sort of “demonstration effect” in which high-level
figures model the operative bases of allegiance and reward through
their misconduct, providing a model for subordinates and those
seeking a share of resources or political power.30 We might worry,
as Adam Samaha has explained in a brilliant essay, about
“[a]ppearance driving reality.”31
A worry that apex lawmaking will be taken as exemplary in
this fashion, rather than exceptional, might explain the enduring
appeal of A.V. Dicey’s seminal formulation of the “rule of law.”
One of the several definitions that Dicey offered requires “the
equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land
administered by the Ordinary Law Courts,” and excludes
categorically the possibility of any “exemption of officials or
others from the duty of obedience to the law which governs other
citizens or from the jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals.”32 This is a
requirement that officials not only be responsible before the same
law as citizens, it is a demand that they be responsible in a
particular way. Dicey’s test for the rule of law assumes that the
relevant institutions will be “tribunals,” i.e., that there will be legal
rather than political mechanisms of apex accountability. To be
sure, at the time Dicey wrote, the highest court in the United
Kingdom was drawn from the ranks of the House of Lords. Rather
than a claim about necessary institutional separations, I read to
Dicey to be making a claim about the qualities of regularity, parity,
and even-handedness in the choice of forums through which the
30.
In economics, the “demonstration effect” involves a rather more
beneficent intergenerational mimicry of donative transfers to ancestors. See
Andreea Mitrut & François-Charles Wolff, A Causal Test of the Demonstration
Effect Theory, 103 ECON. LETTERS 52, 52–53 (2009). For a useful study of the
role that corruption of this sort plays in modern African democracies, see
Alexander Beresford, Power, Patronage, and Gatekeeper Politics in South
Africa, 114 AFR. AFF. 226, 226–27 (2015) (“Political leaders are said to derive
support and legitimacy by distributing patronage.”).
31.
Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1577 (2012).
32.
A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 120 (1885 (Liberty Fund ed. 1982)
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criminal law is enforced. But it is quite striking that his definition
of the rule of law not only compels the plenary accountability of
apex officials before the criminal law; it also demands that such
accountability be rendered by quintessentially legal rather than
political implements.
A reasonable constitutional designer, then, is under no
compulsion to address apex criminality in her text. Recent
constitutional design experience, though, suggests that many other
constitutional designers see some reason to do so (although there is
not much scholarship on how the resulting institutional choices
have worked out), and it is possible to discern powerful reasons for
doing so rooted in a very foundational understanding of the rule of
law. The balance of evidence, in my view, thus makes it plausible,
albeit not necessary, to address apex criminality in the text of a
constitution.
A. Apex Accountability and the Forms of Democratic Political
Life
Another difficult predicate question, though, awaits: What
exactly do we mean when we ask for a “superior” system of apex
accountability? That is, what exactly should the design of
accountability institutions strive to do? The question implies some
totting up of costs and benefits—but it is hardly clear from the
question’s face that we know what counts as a cost, and what
counts as a benefit. For reasons developed below, I think it would
be a mistake to analyze this design choice in strictly welfarist
terms. Instead, I think it is more useful to think about apex
accountability institutions in terms of the kind of democratic
political life or political culture one wants to foster. To develop
this point, I will first explain why familiar welfarist criteria are
unhelpful, and then will explain what I do think worth attending by
explaining how a constitutional designer might strive to elicit a
certain kind of domestic political life, or, stated otherwise, a
distinctive constitutional project.
One starting point for thinking about the question of how to
design mechanisms to address apex criminality is to be found in
law-and-economics-inflected scholarship. It generally focuses on
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the maximization of social welfare given the costs and benefits of
various regulatory devices. But it need not take this form. Like
other kinds of consequentialism, welfarism need not be
operationalized through a command to maximize some metric. It
might also be pursued, among other strategies, through a
‘maximim’ strategy that is organized around the idea that we
should focus on mitigating as much as possible the potential ‘bad’
states of the world.
But while it seems right to me to direct inquiry toward the
expected state of the world once a particular constitutional design
is adopted, a simple welfarist framing is all that helpful here, or
perhaps more generally in respect to constitutional design.33 A first
difficulty arises in the deep, perhaps insurmountable problems of
writing down a social welfare function for a complex society
characterized by large variation in background entitlements and
innate capabilities. A second problem arises in thinking how
constitutional design can be deduced from that social welfare
function. Constitutions are instruments to manage political,
military, and social risk. Even with a decent measure of social
welfare in hand, a constitutional designer must assign probabilities
to political risk that, even in retrospect, can seem wildly unlikely.
(Did you anticipate in 2015 a Trump presidency allegedly
propelled to power by a social-media-based Russian conspiracy?
What is the risk, now he is in office, that Trump will decline to
recognize the legitimacy of an election result that does not run in
his favor?). Without applying an extremely demanding discount
rate, it is hard to see how welfarism can plausibly be applied to
questions of complex constitutional design in general. There is no
reason to think that the risk of apex criminality is difficulty. Given
the potential for pervasive low-level criminality—i.e., Walzer’s
dirty hands problem34—it may be very hard to know ex ante how
likely that apex criminality will be a serious problem, or precisely
what kind of problem it will be in the medium or long term.
If the basic currency of the cost-benefit calculation is elusive,
a constitutional designer might settle on something more effable.
33.
34.

Or so I have argued elsewhere. Huq, supra note 21, at 43-52.
See supra text accompanying notes 25 and 26.
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One potential object of her attention are the consequences of the
institutional responses to apex criminality to the quality of
democratic political interaction that her constitution will likely
induce.
As the burden of accountability shifts from one
institutional foot to another, the forms through which political
contestation flows will change. This in turn will nudge the
incentives, dispositions, and preferences of officials whose careers
and daily working lives are embedded in constitutionally shaped
institutions. In this fashion, institutional choices embedded in a
constitution have a dynamic effect on the quality of democratic
political culture.
This is not a terribly new point, at least when pitched in the
abstract. There are countless ways in which our schools,
workplaces, social clubs, and religious associations shape
preferences and beliefs. From Madison onward, it has been
thought that an important entailment of political institutions’
design is the manner in which they nudge and tweak the
preferences of official actors.35 To put this in more metaphorical
terms, the choice about how elective and bureaucratic structures
respond to high-level criminality matters to the character of the
national democratic project. It changes the downstream quality of
political life woven by the back-and-forth between persons,
institutions, and conventions. In particular, a constitutional design
might be concerned about the aggregate of dispositions, incentives,
and preferences brought to bear by senior political actors. Call this
a political culture.
Precisely what kind of national political culture is desirable—
and, as important, what kinds should be sworn off—presents rather
subtle questions that are not necessarily amenable to an
econometrician’s weights and measures. Should political life be
characterized by sharp, and even angry, contestation? Or it is better
served by the restraining friction of conventions and expectations
of mannered interaction? This is not a question with an obvious
answer. Normative judgment matters more than empirical
35.
For a recent recapitulation and a tentative defense of the
Madisonian account of official psychology, see David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq,
Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law, 85 U. CHI. L. REV.1 (2018).
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measurement. Indeed, the nature and proper character of political
life, and the necessary virtues or dispositions for its successful
prosecution, have been perpetual sources of disagreement within
political philosophy, with starkly different accounts of politics
being offered as early as the pre-Socratics. Thankfully, we can
hold in abeyance the most fractious of those disputes in favor of a
more localized inquiry into the character of a healthy democratic
political culture. By considering the ways in which institutional
checks on apex criminality would shape that rather more
distinctive political project, we can start to grasp the considerations
that animate the institutional choice at stake here.
I think there are two main ways in which political culture—
again, the aggregate of dispositions, incentives, and preferences
brought to bear by senior political actors—might be unhealthily
distorted by apex-criminality accountability. These are a concern
for litigiousness in deliberative politics, and a concern for
politicization in rule-of-law institutions. The first concern,
litigiousness, pertains to the quality of deliberative politics
conducted by elected officials in both the legislative and executive
branch. It starts from the premise that, all else being equal, those
bodies are characterized by a high degree of serious, principled
deliberation about questions that matter to the polity, and that such
deliberation yields considered judgments in the form of laws and
regulations that advance the public interest. Not only is this
premise consistent with the immanent possibility of sharp
disagreement, it also incorporates the assumption that members of
the polity disagree sharply enough about how the public good is
defined and pursued that good-faith deliberation is needed as an
alternative to more violent confrontation.36
Institutionalized responses to apex criminality might derail
beneficial democratic deliberation in one of two ways. First, there
is perhaps a risk that the policy disagreements that are endemic to a
polity will be treated as points of legal infidelity. Rather than
domesticating the polity’s endogenous conflict, the law’s decision
36.
On the conflict channeling function of constitutions, see Tom
Ginsburg & Aziz Huq, What Can Constitutions Do?: The Afghan Case, 25 J.
DEM. 116, 122–26 (2014).
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to treat policy disagreements as a justification for punishment
might escalate the stakes of political disagreement. A policy
dispute might be taken as evidence of constitutional infidelity. At
the extreme, an unraveling of institutional order is at least
conceivable. For if any policy dispute can catalyze the end of a
political career, there is a risk that incumbents will use extraconstitutional means to short-circuit policy debate. Even short of
that extreme outcome, the temptation to treat policy divides as
matters of potential criminal liability might lead political elites to
frame partisan divides as more extreme, and more moralized
matters. Their cues might induce more general divergence in
popular views. Destabilizing popular polarization will ensure if
politics is not a matter of reasonable disagreements with
reasonable co-citizens, but a demand to compromise with felons.
Concerns of this ilk are hardly far-fetched. Indeed, a concern
about the transformation of policy debates into removal-oriented
litigation might explains James Madison’s objection, raised during
the Philadelphia Convention debates, to George Mason’s proposal
to allow impeachment for “maladministration” as well as high
crimes and misdemeanors.37 Madison might well have been
concerned that Mason’s proposal would have transformed too
many policy debates into impeachment battles. He might have
been concerned, that is, about the transformation of policy into
legal debates. The same concern is articulated today in the U.S.
context as a concern about the “criminalization of political
differences,”38 a complaint about a putatively extreme
manifestation of a more diffuse culture of litigiousness and
extreme partisanship.
A second, subtler form of this concern is that institutional
design will influence the agenda for political choice, with
substantive questions of national policy being crowded out by
“scandals that are often imaginary and that, even if real, usually do
not deserve the prominence” they end up receiving.39 This
37.
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 550 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911).
38.
Dershowitz, supra note 8.
39.
Sunstein, supra note 22, at 2268.
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argument hinges on the possibility that the initial sorting rule for
an accountability devices generates more false positives than true
positives, but that partisan opponents of an accused figure have the
incentive and means to leverage false positives in ways that hinder
effective deliberative government. (Think of the positions of
President Clinton’s and President Trump’s defenders). Scandal, on
this view, is merely “a tool of political combat,” rather than “part
of a vibrant movement to reconstruct institutions.”40 Fighting
about whether or not fellatio is oral sex, or whether a marginal
increase in a hotel room rate is an “emolument,” might (depending
on one’s priors about sexual intercourse or the morality of giftgiving) are examples of false positives that have a distortive effect
on the quality of democratic debate.
Concerns about litigiousness in deliberative politics, however,
do not mechanically translate into a recommendation for an
institutional choice. On their face, they hinge on the potential for
changes to behavior in political institutions, rather than in
prosecutor’s chambers or grand jury rooms. This would suggest
that deliberative institutions should be insulated from
accountability processes in some fashion. But the same arguments
can and have been articulated forcefully against legal instruments
of accountability perceived as running amok: That is, the excessive
operation of legal institutions of accountability may distort
democratic deliberation.41 This might point toward the creation of
political checks on legal mechanisms of accountability, which is a
sort of mixed strategy. Alternatively, and to my mind most
persuasively, one might infer a need for stricter acoustic separation
of accountability processes through internalized norms of
professional probity and bureaucratic regularity regardless of their
location.42
40.
JULIAN E. ZELIZER, ON CAPITOL HILL: THE STRUGGLE TO REFORM
CONGRESS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, 1948–2000, at 178 (2004).
41.
See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 2268 (criticizing the Independent
Counsel Act on the ground that it “damage[d] processes of democratic
deliberation by deflecting attention from serious issues involving the effects of
policy on human lives”).
42.
See David A. Strauss, The Independent Counsel Statute: What
Went Wrong?, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 651, 653 (1999) (arguing that “you need
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On the other side of the ledger is a concern about
politicization in rule-of-law institutions. Again, this argument has
several strands. Most simply, it presses on the principle that so
long as a person has been elected to high office, it is centrally the
responsibility of the electorate to decide whether she should be
ejected from that office.
Because accountability decisions
necessarily implicate the possibility that a person will complete an
elective term of office, they are necessarily political. As such,
these decisions should be made by the electorate or, as a second
best, by an “august . . . representative . . . and . . . accountable
deliberative body.”43 Legal mechanisms of accountability, on this
view, are a democratic malapropism.
This argument, while alluring to American ears, rings hollow
in constitutional contexts with nonelective mechanisms for
enabling the transfer of power, such as the parliamentary vote of
no-confidence. The latter renders prime ministers far more
dependent than presidents are on legislators’ perceptions of
political success; it hence makes them more vulnerable to the
vicissitudes of policy failure or success.44 No confidence protocols
suggest that removal mechanisms can be infused with democratic
considerations without being directly popular in character. In the
United States, complaints about the nondemocratic character of a
presidential indictment on democratic grounds ring hollow for a
something--some institutional structure--to hold government officials in line. In
the case of prosecutors, that check cannot come from the courts, except in
extraordinary instances. The limits have to be imposed on a much more
workaday level, by a supervisor or a colleague”).
43.
Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The Presidential Privilege
Against Prosecution, 2 NEXUS 11, 20 (1997).
44.
WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 56-57 (Miles
Taylor, ed., 2001) (describing operation of vote of no confidence in the English
context). The South African Supreme Court, in a fascinating case, had cause to
construe the impeachment provisions of the South African Constitution, and
held that the parliament had to find that one of the factual bases for removal
existed before the removal of then-President Jacob Zuma. Pierre de Vos,
Constitutional Court Impeachment Judgment: What Was the Disagreement
Between the Majority and the Dissent?, CONSTITUTIONALLY SPEAKING (Jan. 9,
2018), https://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/constitutional-court-impeachmentjudgment-what-was-the-disagreement-between-the-majority-and-minority/.
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different reason. The elaborate and increasingly non-majoritarian
alchemy of the Electoral College means presidents cannot always
claim a simple democratic pedigree in the first instance. And if
their selection is not purely democratic in character, it is hard to
see why removal should not also deviate from the democratic
norm.
An alternative objection to the use of legal rather than political
instruments focuses on the illicit injection of basal political
considerations into rule-of-law institutions, such as the prosecutor
or the grand jury, so as to render the latter ineffectual or
illegitimate. Even in the absence of partisan motives—the
argument would go—the power to take down high elected officials
may well prove too alluring a career-making move to be resisted
by most prosecutors. Anticipating this risk, elected officials will
perceive a powerful need to seize control of legal implements of
accountability. The resulting rush to capture the instruments of
prosecution will then tend to place great pressure upon putatively
apolitical institutions.
The result in extremis is a set of
prosecutorial instruments that in effect function as tools of political
patronage. Under this system, as the Brazilian autocrat Gertulio
Vargas pithily put it, “[f]or my friends, everything; for my
enemies, the law.”45
A subtler argument from politicization would hinge on the
immense discretionary authorities prosecutors often have. In the
American system, as in most other jurisdictions, few instruments
exist for piercing general invocations of discretionary authority to
evaluate the motives of prosecutors in particular cases.46 Given
that opacity, public trust in the bona fides of prosecutors must rest
on an alternative signal of the prosecutor’s credible commitment to
neutral use of state power.47 For example, some commentators
45.
Guillermo O’Donnell, Why the Rule of Law Matters, 15 J. DEM.
32, 40 (2004).
46.
See Aziz Z. Huq, What is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L.
REV.-- (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 52).
47.
For a general discussion of the relation of prosecutors to
democratic government, see Máximo Langer & David Alan Sklansky,
Prosecutors and Democracy—Themes and Counterthemes (Epilogue) (UCLA
Sch. of Law, Pub. L. Research Paper No. 16-58, Stanford Pub. L. Working
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have flagged certain ethical rules that embody “the prosecutor's
special ethical position as a servant of the public trust.”48 To the
extent that prosecutors have ways to signal their credibility and
fidelity to rule-of-law values, through, it may be difficult for them
to effectively convey these messages when they are tasked with
investigating apex criminality. If “the mass media build[s] from
every ethically questionable molehill a mountainous betrayal of
public trust,” 49 for instance, prosecutors will have a hard time
explaining why they decline to prosecute. For fervent supports of a
president, conversely, any decision to proceed with a prosecution
may be ipso facto treated as evidence of the “deep state” at work. 50
As a result of these dynamics, I suspect that decisions to
investigate or prosecute apex criminality, as well as decisions not
to do so, will inevitably be construed as partisan in character. At
the very least, it will often be very difficult to prove to the public
that any given decision to prosecute (or to decline prosecution) was
free of partisan influences. Prosecutors generally will not be able
to disclose sufficient information about like cases to assuage
concerns about biased enforcement given the powerful privacy
interests possessed by suspects who are not prosecuted. Public
trust in prosecutors, and perhaps the criminal justice system more
generally, may well wane.
The force of these worries is an empirical matter, and I
make no claim about their magnitude here. A constitutional
designer, often with the same dearth of objective data, must decide
how serious each one of these concerns is and tack accordingly in
Paper No. 2880538, 2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2880538. Langer and
Sklansky usefully flag several ways in which the relationship between
prosecutors and democracy can be configured. See id.
48.
Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines,
81 CAL. L. REV. 1471, 1497 (1993). I am skeptical public knowledge of ethical
rules is robust enough for them to serve this trust-building function.
49.
Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 105, 136 (1988).
50.
Aaron Blake, Why Trump’s attacks on Mueller Just Might Work,
WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2018/03/19/why-trumps-attacks-on-mueller-just-mightwork/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9cfef3ec8e70.
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her planning. She might observe that all of these concerns hinge in
some measure on concerns about spillovers between discrete legal
and political functions. That is, she may understand the problem
as one of motivational contamination. A logical solution to this
concern is to establish high walls between the different branches of
government, and then to situate accountability mechanisms in the
right side of the fence.
But, even assuming this is the right diagnosis, it is worth
asking whether branch-level fences are is the only way to avoid
having too much (criminal) law in politics, or a surfeit of politics
in law? This question is a large one that may have no general
answer, and I want to make one relatively modest point in
concluding: I want specifically to resist the inference that the right
institutional design is necessarily one that cuts sharply between the
legal and political at the branch level. This is so for three reasons
of varying strength.
A first reason focuses on the strength of institutional
membranes generally as solutions to deficiencies of incentive or
disposition. There is an impressive body of scholarship casting
aspiration on this possibility.51 Here, one might press against
branch-level solutions by pointing out that both legal and political
instruments of accountability ultimately have political foundations.
The effective operation of either depends on the willingness of
pivotal political actors to support accountability given its political
costs. Leon Jaworsky’s appointment, Bill Clinton’s acquittal, and
the ensuing dissolution of the independent counsel’s statutory
authorization—all of these were decisions that hinged how key
political actors perceived the political costs of accountability. Yet
these three cases plainly fall on different sides of the legal/political
line. These political foundations of apex accountability explain
why concerns about litigiousness in deliberative politics can arise
whether accountability in grounded in a legal or a political home.
Such political foundations also render the politicization of rule-oflaw institutions an unavoidable and permanent possibility,
especially if the political cost of violating a law is otherwise
51.
See Fontana & Huq, supra note 35, at 21-27 (summarizing and
citing the relevant literature).
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weak.52 In the U.S. system, for example, Congress can always use
the threat of defunding or the repeal of a prosecutorial entity’s
organic statute to influence the trajectory of investigations into
official conduct. Because Congress cannot credibly commit not to
do so through any legal means, its commitment to abstain from
interference via fiscal mischief necessarily rests on political
grounds.
Although I am sympathetic to the idea that mere institutional
specification does little to change extant partisan incentives, I
would be careful not to press this leveling logic too far. Not all
institutional formations are equally vulnerable to political
influences. It is possible to craft institutions that are less sensitive
rather than more sensitive to variance in political winds.
Experience suggests that this relative autonomy, moreover, can
exist on either side of the legislative/executive divide. Hence, it
may be that Congressional Budget Office in practice is less
‘political,’ in the sense of being responsive to short-term political
volatility, than the putatively independent Federal Reserve. As
Sarah Binder and Mark Spindel have recently documented, the
central bank in fact operates in close dependence upon Congress.53
That is, autonomy from transient politics may be feasible, but it is
not simply a matter of placing institutions in the right branch.
A second reason for resisting absolute separation resists the
premise that accountability is a single task that can be neatly
aligned with one or the other branch of government. Notice
instead that there are two separate tasks entailed in accountability
for apex criminality. The first is epistemic, and involves the
investigation of allegations. The second is evaluative, and entails a
determination of what consequences should flow from an
investigation’s factual findings. At first blush, the criterion of
comparative institutional specialization might suggest a bifurcation
of these tasks between professional investigators and political
52.
As suggested in Frederick Schauer, The Political Risks (If Any) of
Breaking the Law, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 83, 91 (2012).
53.
See SARAH BINDER & MARK SPINDEL, THE MYTH OF
INDEPENDENCE: HOW CONGRESS GOVERNS THE FEDERAL RESERVE 2-3 (2017)
(discussing “interdependence” of the Federal Reserve and Congress).

Page 26

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3185835

UCLA L Rev. 65:6

actors.54 For instance, investigation might be the obligation of
professional prosecutors, whereas legislators would evaluate and
assign punishment by creating ex ante schedules of penalties.
But I think we should be cautious in assuming the validity of
such claims. We should be more open to the possibility that
competence is endogenous to constitutional design choices. As a
historical matter, congressional investigations of executive
malfeasance (which is a broader category than criminality) have
been frequent and effective in damaging presidents’ public
standing,55 even as Congress has generally been loath to
impeach.56 This historical pattern suggests that there is nothing
inevitable about prosecutorial comparative advantage in epistemic
matters. The analysis is further complicated by secular trends such
as increasing partisan polarization within Congress and a decaying
rate of investigation.57 One can reasonably take the view that the
appropriate response to the progressive deterioration of legislative
capacities for investigation and judgment is not accommodation.
Rather, in a Thayerian spirit, the best response might be to excise
completely the moral hazard created by a prosecutorial backstop,
leaving Congress with sole responsibility for both acquiring
information and putting it to normative use.
Finally, it is worth recalling that U.S. style separation of
functions among distinct branches is a contingent constitutional
design choice, and an increasingly unpopular one at that.58 Many
other polities work tolerably well without that particular kind of
institutional separation. In the United Kingdom, for example, an
important instrument of accountability is the parliamentary
54.
Cf. Bauer, supra note 7 (suggesting that Congress relies on
professional investigators, such as those employed by a special counsel).
55.
See Douglas L. Kriner & Eric Schickler, Investigating the
President: Committee Probes and Presidential Approval, 1953–2006, 76 J. POL.
521, 532 (2014).
56.
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 108–13
(2017) (listing all impeachments by the House).
57.
Kriner & Schickler, supra note 55, at 524–25 fig.1 (documenting
the decaying rate of investigation).
58.
GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 28 (presenting data on the declining
influence of the separation of powers model).
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commission of inquiry, an intermittent institution most often
revived in the wake of public crises for which legislators wish to
avoid blame.59 Yet once up and running, these bodies appear to
operate with a high degree of independence from direct political
control. This is despite the fact that they remain technically within
parliamentary control.60 This model suggests that it is possible to
create institutions, even ones that are intermittent in character, that
are legislative in terms of their institutional home, but that are still
capable of exercising independent judgment in the pursuit of an
investigation.
All this is to say that the dispositional and motivational
firewalling of accountability mechanisms from political life so as
to prevent both the diffusion of litigiousness and the political
capture of rule-of-law institutions. Walls to prevent signal bleed
from accountability demands may be useful, in short, but they need
not operate at the level of the branch.
CONCLUSION
My aim in this short piece has been to map out some
considerations that most usefully inform the design of
accountability mechanisms for apex criminality. Having set forth
some needful caveats as to whether it is really worth the candle of
constitutionalizing apex accountability devices, I have suggested
that the principal costs of such mechanisms sound in the ways they
can distort political culture. This conduces to separation as a
remedy, although I have cautioned against assuming that using the
division of power into government branches is either necessary or
sufficient to that end.
59.
See Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan, Reflection in the Shadow of Blame:
When Do Politicians Appoint Commissions of Inquiry?, 40 BRIT. J. POL. SCI.
613, 614 (2010) (determining blame-avoidance to be a motivation for the
creation of such bodies).
60.
See Adam Burgess, The Changing Character of Public Inquiries in
the (Risk) Regulatory State, 6 BRIT. POL. 3, 6–8 (2011) (describing commissions
as operating relatively independently from parliamentary forces).
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Instead, it may well be more useful to recognize that
institutions that preserve the quality of political life are themselves
grounded largely on shared understandings and dispositions. It
depends on participants in a political system having “the judgment
to discern which issues are political” from questions of law, and
“respect for the structures and procedures that frame the political
enterprise” such that he will “resist[] the temptation to . . . further
his own aims by subverting the formalities it imposes.”61 Political
culture—the network of dispositions and incentives that form the
wellsprings of political action—hence may rest on institutions, but
the health of those institutions is a function not just of savvy design
but a persisting commitment to the exercise of good judgment and
a resistance to the temptations to “subvert[]” whatever forms have
been set forth.
However mediated and strengthened by
institutional design it might be, the robustness of democratic
institutions under the rule of law cannot be disentangled from the
character and motivations of those elected or appointed to high
office.

61.
Jeremy Waldron, Arendt’s Constitutional Politics, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HANNAH ARENDT 201, 202 (Dana Villa ed., 2000).
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